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ABSTRACT
The interpretation and enforcement of international human rights law has
tremendously evolved since the adoption of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights. The Charter introduced procedural and jurisdictional paradigms that
have moulded this branch of law to resonate Africa’s context and values, by for
instance, evolving concepts and approaches distinct from those of the other regions.
While striving to achieve this, the Charter has also had to grapple with an avalanche
of procedural and jurisdictional challenges. This Article highlights these challenges
and proposes ways in which they can be surmounted. It proceeds on the premise that
contrary to the usual and indeed mistaken presumption that the flaws in Africa’s
regional human rights regime are irreparable, certain reforms could still be initiated
and compromises made as a way of surmounting some of these challenges.
I INTRODUCTION
International human rights law is now recognised as a distinct branch of law with its
own jurisprudence and norms. It has registered a tremendous positive impact on the
legal systems throughout the world.1 The true dimensions of this evolving legal
situation could hardly be foretold half a century ago.2 Umozurike correctly observes
that human rights appeared to enjoy low esteem during the 1970s, particularly in
Africa.3 His observations are based on the passiveness the former Organisation of
African Unity (OAU) maintained in suppressing human rights in a number of
independent African states by ‘unduly emphasising the principle of non-interference
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in the internal affairs of member state’.4 The massacres of thousands of Hutus in
Burundi, as well as the despotic regimes of dictators Idi Amin of Uganda, Marcias
Nguema of Equatorial Guinea and Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African
Republic seem to have escaped the rather blind eye of the then OAU.5
Indeed even events in the international circles at the time were less conducive
to the thriving of a robust human rights culture. International law emphasised the
doctrine of sovereignty of states which in a way created focus on the consolidation of
political power rather than the protection and promotion of human rights. In pursuit of
sovereignty, independent states were constantly in conflict amongst themselves while
the non-independent states pursued their independence. There was therefore an
upsurge of violence and by extension, violation of human rights. As a result of the
need to contain this state of chaos and stem the egregious violation of human rights
and the culture of impunity, numerous treaties were concluded at both the global and
regional levels creating mechanisms to address this situation.
At the global level, the United Nations created, for example, reporting
mechanisms in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination6; the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR); the Convention Against Torture7; and more recently,
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women.8At regional levels complaints are allowed under the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms9; the American
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Convention on Human Rights10; and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights.11 Some mixed-model approaches have also been initiated to complement the
weaknesses of both the international and national justice systems.12
Whereas the universal system of human rights played a vital role in the
enforcement of international human rights law immediately after the Second World
War, its wide ratione loci undermined its efficacy.13 Other factors such as lack of
adequate resources to accommodate the increasing numbers of violations, the effects
of the cold war and the issue of veto powers made it even harder for international
justice to be pursued from that level. This meant that the practical way to addressing
international human rights issues was through regional efforts. These efforts led to the
emergence of regional human rights systems, namely, the European, Inter-America
and African systems. On the African plane, the establishment of institutions such as
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)14, and more
recently the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights15, was therefore a timely
innovation that somehow encouraged the perpetuation of the culture of human rights
in the continent.
However, no sooner had the African Commission been incepted than a series
of setbacks and hurdles set in. The African human rights regime generally, and the
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African Commission in particular, have been found wanting in a number of areas.16
As a result, the Commission has gradually lost the favour and unique status of being
the only human rights watchdog in the region which it initially enjoyed. Currently,
Africa’s human rights regime is not only the least developed but also the least
effective as compared with its American and European counterparts.17 This is rather
strange especially since the African Charter is the most widely ratified regional
human rights instrument in the world. Despite the unilateral ratification of the African
Charter, human rights have continued to be relentlessly violated in the continent, with
impunity.18 Baimu observes that ‘the fact that conflicts, and the associated massive
human rights violations, have continued to engulf the continent when most of the
African states are bound by the provisions of the Charter, indicates that the African
Charter is still not taken seriously by many African states.’19
To address this anomaly, this paper highlights the procedural as well as
jurisdictional challenges encountered in the interpretation and enforcement of
international human rights law in Africa since the inception of the Charter. It
commences with a brief historical background of Africa’s human and peoples’ rights
regime, followed by a summary of the normative framework. It urges that while, with
certain reforms, Africa’s regime could end up yielding the much-anticipated results,
this will demand a high level of political will and commitment from the states parties
to the Charter; including a considerable degree of compromise of socio-cultural and
political preferences and inclinations.
II HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AFRICA’S HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME
The African human rights regime is a product of prolonged negotiations both within
and outside the continent. Besides the African Charter, the regime is inspired by
several multilateral treaties such as the OAU Convention Governing Aspects of
Refugee Problems;20 the African Convention on the Conservation of Natural
Resources of 1968; the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and
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the Control of Trans-boundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes
Within Africa;21the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of
Terrorism;22 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.23
Notably, even though some aspects of these instruments have a direct bearing on
several rights recognised in the African Charter, the provisions relating to
interpretation and application of the Charter only mandate the African Commission to
‘draw inspiration’24 or ‘take into consideration’25 international law in respect of
human and Peoples’ rights.26 The Charter does not provide for their direct
interpretation or enforcement by the Commission.
Africa’s regional human rights regime was an aftermath of a series of events
that instigated the rise and fall of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The OAU
was established27 to encourage a unified African front.28 It was within the remits of
the OAU that the independence of the African states should be safeguarded and all
forms of colonialism and racism, especially as manifested in Southern Africa, be
ended.29 What therefore gave impetus to the formation of the Organisation was as
Kannyo says ‘the strong and unanimous desire to complete the process of
decolonisation and dismantle the system of apartheid in South Africa.’30 However, the
OAU Charter did not intimate the protection and promotion of human rights as one of
its principal goals. Instead, its objectives simply mentioned the eradication of ‘all
forms of colonialism’ from Africa.31
Dlamini comments that besides the issues of apartheid and decolonisation, the
only sense in which the OAU could be considered as an Organisation for the
21
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promotion of human rights was in relation to its general goal of ‘total advancement of
our peoples in spheres of human endeavours.’32 Kannyo attributes the absence of
human rights provisions in the Charter to the purpose for which the organisation was
established, that is the termination of foreign dominion.33 Perhaps one of OAU’s
major failures was its lack of a human rights Charter; which could have been the
reason why some of its member states lacked comprehensive Bills of Rights in their
Independence Constitutions. Member states were expected to ascribe to the human
rights fundamentals entrenched in the Universal Declaration of human rights.34
The OAU leadership, for political expediency, resisted agitation by non-state
actors for a proactive human rights regime. The incumbent OAU leaders were
reluctant to embrace a human rights regime that would strictly define benchmarks for
compliance.35 Given the alarming levels of violations and the attendant impunity,
there was so much agitation that resistance by the OAU could no longer hold back
reforms. Notably the wave of change had by then got the eye of the international
community. Other contributing factors were socio-economic crises of the late 1970s
and the early 1980s that engendered a crisis of political legitimacy in a number of
states.36 These socio-political crises precipitated international response by powerful
nations such as the US calling for a proactive human rights dispensation. As
Umozurike puts it:
Chief among these was the emphasis that President Carter placed on human rights in the
international relations of the United States. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975, signed by the
United States, Canada, and 33 European countries, emphasised respect for human rights.
Watch committees were subsequently set up to monitor observance and this kept the issue
alive in international politics…. Though unsuccessful, an attempt was made to include human
rights in the renewed EEC-A-C-P pact, the Lome II Convention. The stage was thus set both
internally and externally for the debut of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.37

The search for a new human rights dispensation in Africa goes back to as early as
1961 when African jurists met in Lagos, Nigeria, under the auspices of the
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and proposed the promulgation of a Human
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Rights Charter for Africa.38 Later in 1967, jurists from Francophone African states
meeting in Dakar, Senegal, reiterated this call.39 In the same year, Nigeria proposed to
the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) the establishment of regional
Human Rights Commissions where none existed.40 Though their importance could
hardly be overemphasised at that moment, it was common cause that regional
commissions would be meaningful if set up by the members of the regions themselves
and not imposed from outside. The UNCHR then advised the UN Secretary-General
‘to organise seminars in those regions where no human rights commissions existed
with a view to discussing the need for them.’41
In 1969, a UN seminar was held in Cairo, Egypt, at the close of which the
participants, including 19 African states, requested the UN Secretary-General to, inter
alia, communicate the report and its recommendations to the OAU Secretary-General
and members. One of the recommendations was the setting up of a regional
commission in Africa that would be fully supported by the OAU member states.42 The
Cairo seminar opened the floodgate for other seminars, meetings and conferences in
various parts of Africa. These were held in Lusaka, Zambia in 197043; Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia in 197144; Yaounde, Cameroon in 197145; Libreville, Gabon in 197146; and
Dar-es-salaam, Tanzania in 1973.47 Most of these meetings echoed the urgent need for
an African human rights commission or some other human rights protection
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mechanism.48 Unable to bear the intense pressure, both internally and externally, the
OAU caved in to the demands.
At a Summit conference held in Monrovia in July 1979, the OAU resolved to
commence the process of establishing a commission on human rights.49 Later in the
same year the UN convened another seminar to discuss the possibility of establishing
an African Human rights Commission. The outcome of this seminar was the
establishment of a working group to draft concrete proposals for the creation of an
African Commission on Human Rights.50 After a series of meetings held in Dakar,
Senegal, in 1979 and Banjul, the Gambia, in 1980 and January 1981, the preliminary
draft for the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was finally adopted by
the OAU Council of Ministers, with some modifications. The 18th Assembly of Heads
of State and Government (AHSG) adopted the Charter in its session held in Nairobi,
Kenya.51 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights entered in force on 21
October 1986.52
The adoption of the Charter paved way for the institutionalisation of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. This Commission was formally
initiated in November 2, 1987 and its Banjul Headquarters were established in the
middle of 1989. The time span between the initiation of the Commission and the
establishment of its headquarters in Banjul speaks volumes about the ‘cold reception’
it got from its political principal, the OAU.
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C Dlamini, ‘Towards a Regional Protection of Human Rights in Africa: The African Charter on
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III THE REGIME UNDER THE CHARTER
Currently, Africa has the largest regional human rights regime in the world courtesy
of the unilateral ratification of its Charter by all states parties thereto.53 The regime
comprises of the African Charter together with all the protection and promotional
mechanisms, rules and procedures created under it. The Charter has three major parts.
The first catalogues the rights and duties imposed by the Charter54; the second
contains measures and safeguards for realising its two-fold purpose of promoting and
protecting human rights; the third sets out general provisions on the ratification of the
Charter, the special protocols and amendments.55 A detailed examination of these subdivisions is beyond the scope of this article and is discussed in another article under
consideration elsewhere. Since much has been written elsewhere on the substantive
provisions of the Charter, this paper examines two important aspects of the Charter,
namely, the uniqueness of the Charter regime and the enforcement of rights under it.
(A) THE UNIQUE ASPECTS OF THE REGIME ESTABLISHED BY THE
CHARTER
The Charter ushered in a rather unique human rights regime that distinctively deviates
from those in other regional human rights regimes that preceded it. First, because of
the ‘claw-back’ clauses the enjoyment of some rights is subject to the domestic laws
of the states parties.56 These rights include the right to liberty,57 freedom of
expression,58 freedom of association,59 freedom of assembly and movement,60 right to
property, as well as the right to participate in the government of one’s country.61 The
negative effects of these clauses are highlighted later in this article. It is notable
however, that besides these ‘claw-back’ clauses, the Charter conspicuously lacks a
derogation clause. This in effect means that no emergency or special circumstances
53

R Kiwanuka, ‘The Meaning of “People” in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’,
(1988) 82 American J of Intl’L, 81.
54
This part consists of 29 Articles.
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For an appraisal of the Charter see P Takirambudde, ‘Six Years of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights: An Assessment’ (1991) 7/2 Lesotho LJ 41; C Welch Jr. & R Meltzer (Eds),
Human Rights and Development in Africa (1984) 128-51; See also Dlamini (note 48 above).
56
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rights on national legislation.
57
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down by law.’
58
Art 8 states that ‘no one may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the
exercise of these freedoms’.
59
Art 10.
60
Arts 11 and 12, respectively.
61
Arts 13 and 14, respectively.
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can justifiably suspend the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter.62 The
Charter only underscores the need for individuals to exercise their rights ‘with due
regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.’63
The notable absence of a derogation clause in the regime has been criticised by
various scholars and commentators.64
The second notable unique attribute of the Charter relates to its Socioeconomic rights.65 Presumably, the intention of incorporating this genre of rights was
to give effect to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
at the regional level.66 This approach, however, differs from that of the Covenant on
the one hand, and the European system, on the other. While these rights may
progressively be realised under the Covenant and are provided for in a separate
European instrument- the European Social Charter- the African Charter not only
provides for the unconditional realisation of these rights but also interweaves them
with the civil and political rights.67 Because realisation of Socio-economic rights in
the Charter is not subjected to availability of resources, some critics dismiss the
Charter as overly ambitious and unrealistic.68
Thirdly, the regime’s invention of ‘Peoples rights’ introduces a unique concept
in the international human rights law arena. These rights include equality of all
Peoples,69 right to existence and self-determination,70 right to sovereignty over group
62

In Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project V Nigeria communication Nos 105/93,
130/94 and 152/96 the African Commission stated inter alia that Governments should avoid restricting
rights, and have special care with regard to those rights protected by constitutional or international
human rights law. See also Amnesty international v Zambia Communication No 212/98 (2000) 7 IHRR.
286; G Naldi ‘Limitation of rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The
contribution of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 113-114.
63
Art 27(2).
64
See generally, R Gittleman ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Legal analysis’
(1982) 22 Virginia J of Intl L 667; E Ankumah ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights (1996) 176; P Kunig ‘The Protection of Human Rights by International Law in Africa’ (1982)
25 German Yearbook of Intl L 138.
65
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wealth and natural resources (including the right to dispose of the same),71 right to
development,72 right to national and international peace and security, and the right to
a general satisfactory environment favourable to development.73 Even though the
Charter recurrently refers to ‘peoples’, the concept is not defined anywhere in its
provisions hence creating uncertainty and unnecessary speculation on the true import
of the term.
Another unique feature of the Charter is that unlike other regimes, it imposes
duties upon states and even individuals. Duties of states are contained in Arts 20(3),
21(5), 22(2), 25 and 26.74 Arts 27-29 impose duties on individuals. These include the
following: duties to the family, society, state, other legally recognised communities
and the international community75; duty to respect fellow human beings76; duty to
preserve the harmonious development of the family, strengthen African cultural
values and to preserve national security as well as promote African unity.77
However, unlike the American Convention on Human Rights and the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the African
Charter does not provide for a human rights court. This has largely been attributed,
and pretentiously so, to supposed ‘African cultural emphasis on conciliation rather
than formal adversarial settlement of disputes.’78 Supposedly, the drafters of the
Charter were guided by the principle that the instrument ‘should reflect the African
conception of human rights and should take as a pattern the African philosophy of law
and meet the needs of Africa.’79 The absence of an African Court provoked heated
debate and controversy, consequently, in 1994, led to commencement of efforts to
71
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facilitate the formation of an African human rights Court. This process culminated in
the adoption on 9 June 1998 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights.80 Despite the entry into force of this Protocol, the Court is yet to commence its
work.
(b) ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS UNDER THE CHARTER
At inception, the Charter only made provision for the creation of an African
Commission on Human and People’ Rights as the principal enforcement organ.81
However, today the African human rights regime boasts of an African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights. It was intended for the Commission to be the key organ
for promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in Africa.82 Consisting of
eleven Commissioners elected by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government
(AHSG) by secret ballot to serve for a six-year period83, the Commission is, in broad
terms, mandated to: promote human and peoples’ rights; ensure the protection of
human and peoples' rights under conditions laid down by the Charter; at the request of
a state party, an institution of the OAU or an African Organization recognized by the
OAU, interpret the Charter; and perform any other tasks which may be entrusted to it
by the AHSG.84
In its promotional functions, the Commission is expected to, among other
things, engage in: information collection; formulation and development of principles
relating to human rights to guide legislative actions by African governments; and,
collaboration with other African and international institutions concerned with the
promotion and protection of human rights.85 Periodic reporting by states has also been
said to be a promotional function of the Commission because it seeks to evaluate the
extent to which states parties have implemented the provisions of the Charter in their
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respective jurisdictions. Art 62 obligates states parties to furnish country reports every
two years.86
The Commission performs its protection functions in terms of Arts 47 to 60 of
the Charter. In particular, Arts 47 to 54 make provision for interstate complaints while
Arts 55 to 60 establish the machinery for the receipt and handling of individuals’
complaints.87 Before the substantive consideration of individual complaints however,
all communications are brought, by the Chairman of the Commission, to the
knowledge of the state concerned. The state is then given three months to respond to
the complaint.88 When it appears after the Commission’s deliberations that one or
more communication relates to special cases revealing the existence of a series of
serious or massive violations of human and peoples' rights, the Commission draws the
attention of the AHSG to these special cases.89 The Assembly may then request the
Commission to undertake an in-depth study of these cases and make a factual report,
accompanied by its finding and recommendations.
Besides the mandate given to the Chairperson of the Commission to publish
the reports on its activities after the AHSG has considered them, all measures taken
within the provisions of the Charter are supposed to remain confidential unless the
Assembly decides otherwise.90 As stated earlier in this paper, the monopoly enjoyed
by the Commission ended with the adoption of the Protocol Establishing the African
Court and the subsequent inauguration of the Court. However, since the Court is not
yet fully operational it is difficulty to state with certainty the challenges it is bound to
face when it finally commences business.
IV

JURISDICTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES

This part discusses the jurisdictional and procedural challenges encountered in the
interpretation and enforcement of international human rights law since the inception
of the Charter. Jurisdictional challenges include issues such as normative incoherence,
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ideological differences and political insubordination; while the procedural challenges
comprise issues such as promotional impediments and protection flaws.
(A)JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES
(i) Normative Incoherence
While many believed the entry into force of the African Charter to have heralded the
dawn of new human rights era in Africa, little did such people know what lay in wait
for them. Disappointingly, the Charter seems to have ushered in a weaker regional
normative regime than was initially anticipated. It essentially lacks mandatory norms
as a result of which states parties generally ignore the decision-making and
enforcement procedures created by it.91 Some of the norms are out of tune with
municipal legislation in some member states, making its implementation in such
jurisdiction difficult and even impossible. Its drafters seem to have fully considered
the political and socio-economic diversity and disparities in the continent, which
would have played a critical role in formulating norms that can be appreciated, at least
by a majority of the states.
While the Charter has indeed been ratified unilaterally, some states do not
seem to appreciate some of its importance. No wonder, there is to date very little in
terms of transfer of authority from the states parties to the regional level; making
some individual states more powerful than the regional system. So far, the region has
a ceremonial Charter regime whose presence is inconsequential. The factors that have
contributed to this undesirable situation are discussed below.
As noted earlier in this paper, the substantive provisions of the Charter are
strewed with ‘claw back’ clauses that ‘seem to make the enforcement of rights overly
dependent on municipal law and the utter discretion of national authorities.’92
Apparently, these clauses targeted civil and political rights, which generation of rights
had generated controversy in a number of states prior to the inception of the Charter.93
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The impropriety of ‘claw-back’ clauses has been underscored by a number of legal
scholars. Ankumah, for example, observes that they ‘could render previously granted
rights meaningless.’94 Kunig also finds them defective in the regime since ‘there are
no provisions to ensure that a core of the human rights guarantees prevails against
legislative restrictions.’95 Hopkins for his part says these clauses have reduced the
regime to, ‘…a mixture of international standards…and mere guidelines bordering on
vague statements of amorphous collective aspirations.’96 While it must be
acknowledged that the exclusive use of ‘claw-back’ clauses by the Charter is
undesirable, the Commission’s effort to contain their effects through its case law
should be acknowledged.97
Notably however, the Charter does not contain a derogation clause. It cannot
be clearly established why the drafters of the Charter in their wisdom preferred ‘clawback clauses’ to a derogation clause. There is a fundamental conceptual and
functional difference between the two. Derogation clauses generally seek to limit the
circumstances under which a state may be said to be backtracking from its obligation
to protect and promote certain rights guaranteed to its citizens by the Charter. In the
absence of a derogation clause, a state may choose to backtrack from its obligation
under the Charter at any time it deems fit, to the detriment of its citizens. Yet under
such circumstances, the particular state cannot be legitimately summoned to explain
its conduct. A derogation clause therefore prohibits a state from callously breaching
obligations whenever it feels like and restricts the suspension of the said rights to
certain specified circumstances that may warrant derogation. Whereas a derogation
clause could legitimise the suspension of rights granted under the Charter, ‘claw-back
clauses’ restrict the affected rights ab initio.98 Unlike the former, the latter allow
states parties massive discretionary power. As Higgins correctly observes:
All the major [human rights] instruments thus contain two types of clauses …first a clause
which stipulates that the instrument itself does not give any state, group or person: ‘any right
to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the human
domestic legislation to provide for preventive detention and the clause under Article 13(1) on right to
participate in government accommodates one party and military regimes.
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rights and freedom set forth therein’; second, a general clause which indicates that limitations
upon the exercise of rights may be permitted.99

Another factor underlying normative incoherence in the regime is the concept of
duties. The problem of duties as contemplated in the Charter is their enforceability,
especially, as Amoah observes, ‘if a state party raises a counter-claim against an
aggrieved individual for failure to fulfil his or her individual duties.’100 The
Commission, or even the African Court, may not be well equipped to interpret the
concept of duties in a legalistic sense given that even the framing of these duties in the
Charter is pretty superfluous. Duties can be viewed better from a moral perspective
rather than a legal perspective. Their incorporation therefore creates an obvious
inconsistency in the Charter’s provisions. For one, since every right has an
accompanying duty, the Charter should have been drafted with this in mind instead of
having a separate catalogue of duties whose enforceability is uncertain. Besides, none
of these duties has been legislated by any of the states parties to the Charter; which in
a way signifies a thinking that such prescriptions do not matter to domestic
jurisdictions.
Finally, the unrealistic provisions on Socio-economic rights further weaken
the normative effects of the Charter. The Charter does not provide for the progressive
realisation of these rights subject to availability of resources, as is the case under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Bills of
rights of some African states. Consequently, this stretches socio-economic rights
beyond the enforcement capacity of the regime, reducing them to ‘mere paper
rights’.101
(ii) Ideological Differences
The jurisdictional challenges besetting Africa’s human rights regime pre-date the
existence of the African Charter. The aftermath of colonialism together with the weak
socio-political foundation laid by the OAU Charter introduced a number of hurdles to
the entrenchment of the culture of human rights in the continent. Colonialism and its
fascist ideologies had damning effects on Africa which continue to exert considerable
99
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influence over the continent’s contemporary human rights culture.102 Western
imperialists attempted to supplant Africa’s communal heritage with the European
ideology of individualism, thus leaving behind confused hybridised socio-political
structures at the close of the colonial era.103 This ideology culminated to a crisis in
cultural, social and political identity much as it fostered the socio-political disparities
that were already etched in the continent.104
It has been contended elsewhere that since African people are community or
group oriented, rather than individualistic, human rights are not relevant to Africa.105
According to Hopkins, ‘African culture is still largely understood by African people
in a pre-colonial way- when people did not suffer systematic discrimination, despite
the lack of human rights law guaranteeing individual rights and freedoms and the lack
of legal rules did not necessarily mean that only despotic forms of government
existed.’106 The fact that communalism as practised by the pre-colonial African
societies does not rhyme with the Western ideology of individualism explains in no
uncertain terms why human rights generally, and international human rights law, in
particular, continue to enjoy low esteem in the continent. No doubt, many of these
cultural constraints are still evident in the African perception today.107
Emphatically, the OAU, to its own detriment, ignored the effects of
imperialism and chose to focus on decolonisation rather than human rights. It is trite
that the main concern of the organisation at the time of its formation was the complete
eradication of colonialism from the continent.108 Sadly, the organisation, deducing
from the contents of its Charter, had no time for human rights, to say the least. The
organisation, bent to secure the sovereignty of its member-states, chose to switch from
the African ‘communalism’ ideology it was well-acquainted with, to the European
‘individualism’ ideology, only that ‘individualism’ this time was to be enjoyed at the
102
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state level. States were to be sovereign (individualistic) and their independence
secured from any form of external interference (non-communal). The sudden change
in ideological approaches led to the over-glorification of the two concepts that
eventually consigned the OAU to its political oblivion. These concepts are: sovereign
and territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.
The rights to sovereign integrity and to non-interference in their internal
affairs became prominent shields among the OAU member states whenever they were
called upon either to stop or account for violations within their domestic
jurisdictions.109 Some International human rights lawyers opine that although these
two concepts have garnered unilateral acceptance under International law, their
relevance is completely at odds with international human rights discourse which is
premised on the presumption that states are subordinate to supra-national regimes and
can be compelled to regulate their municipal laws to conform with the tenets of a
supra-national legal order.110 This ideological tension has contributed massively to the
dismal human rights record in the continent. Ironically, even upon the demise of the
OAU, the AU still adopted the two concepts through its Constitutive Act.111
The negative effects of ideological differences have also been felt where
individual states have been compelled by socio-cultural or political circumstances to
develop jurisprudence contrary to that of the African regional system. Some states
have been forced to do so owing to their religious indoctrination. For example, states
that profess Islam inevitably develop jurisprudence in tandem with Islamic laws
which in a number of occasions have clashed with the universally acknowledged
human rights doctrines. African customary law has also been involved in this kind of
clash more than once particularly on the issue of gender. Thus, ideological differences
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of this magnitude are extrapolated into a conflict between the municipal laws and the
international human rights obligations of the states concerned.
The complexity of ideological differences reaches its extremes when the
interpretation of a particular right given by a municipal court is not in tandem with the
jurisprudence evolved by the regional mechanisms. Given such circumstances, which
one of the two competing jurisdictions (or ideologies) ought to prevail? The
magnitude of this problem is so vast that it calls for states to compromise some
aspects of their social, political and religious inclinations to redress certain ideological
conflicts. This is not an easy concession for a number of states, thus explaining why
the interpretation and enforcement of international human rights law in Africa has not
been a child’s play.
(iii) Political Insubordination
Africa, unlike the United Nations and other regions, has a mere declaratory regime.
Events leading to the formation of the OAU in 1963 and even the African Charter
decades later militated against the formation of a stronger regional human rights
regime. Leaders of the then independent African states were not keen to forfeit their
‘hard earned’ sovereignty to a supra-national body for fear of ‘reincarnating’ the
colonial epoch. This resulted to a superficial moral commitment, an emphasis of
ideological differences and ultimately an attitude of indifference towards human
rights violations in the continent.
Unfortunately, the Organization emphasised state cooperation, sovereignty of
states and non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states.112 This explains
why the organisation turned a blind eye to human rights violations that took place
especially in the 1970s and 1980s. It for instance remained silent when Ghana
expelled West African aliens en masse; in Rwanda, the minority Tutsi ethnic group
massacred the Hutu between 1972 and 1973; and Idi Amin expelled Asians from
Uganda, albeit he was later elected the OAU chairman in 1974 at its summit
meeting.113 In this regard, Wiseberg observes:
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By and large, [African] governments have proclaimed humanitarian standards, and have been
prepared to act to uphold or further human rights only where it has been in their political
and/or economic interest to do so. They have not been prepared to speak out or to take action
where political costs would be entailed-where they might embarrass an ally, where protest
might harm their relations with another sovereign, or where economic investments might be
jeopardised. Additionally, there is a tendency towards inertia and indifference if there is
nothing to be gained by challenging a government transgressing against human rights, even if
there is nothing tangible to lose.114

The subordination of the African Commission to the AHSG clearly elaborates the
above sentiments. The Commission is not politically, let alone judicially, independent.
The African Charter provides for the establishment of the Commission ‘within the
OAU’.115 Besides, its Commissioners are political appointees116 and the Rules of
Procedure stipulate that the power to make decisions, including the publication of
measures taken lies with the AHSG.117 Indeed the Commission cannot make binding
decisions against state parties but only recommendations to the AHSG.118 This is in
stark contrast with the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms for instance, which has provision for mechanisms with jurisdiction to make
binding decisions against contracting states.119 The subordination of the Commission
to the AHSG has made it impossible for it to effectively remedy human rights
violations because states, the main perpetrators of violations, have the last word in the
Commission’s work. This has further led to a crisis of credibility, confidence and
legitimacy on the part of the Commission.120
(B) PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES
(i)Promotional Impediments
Examination of reports compiled by member states is one of the Commission’s key
promotional activities. The Charter obliges states parties to submit, every second year,
‘a report on the legislative or other measures taken with a view to giving effect to the
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rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed…’ by it.121 For various reasons, the
state reporting mechanism has not been fruitful. The Charter has failed to address a
number of procedural uncertainties pertaining to state reporting. For example, it fails to
specify to whom the reports should be addressed, by whom they should be examined, if
at all, and what actions should be taken as an outcome of such examination.122 This
lacuna would have prevailed had the Commission not adopted a resolution at its third
session, recommending that the Secretary General of the OAU be mandated by the
AHSG to receive state-reports and communicate them to the Commission without
delay.123 The Commission also recommended that the AHSG entrust it with the task of
examining the periodic reports submitted by the states parties pursuant to Article 62 and
other relevant provisions of the African Charter, as well as authorise it to draft general
guidelines on the form and content of the said periodic reports.124 The Commission was
later entrusted with this task and soon thereafter adopted guidelines for state
reporting.125
It is however clear that states have not been complying with their duty to
report. Statistics indicate that up to the 26th session, only 24 of the 53 states parties
had reported.126 Those states that report fail to comply with the reporting guidelines.
The information provided has been incomplete, scanty, biased and devoid of selfreflection. During examination of the reports, government representatives are seldom
present to participate in, or back up, the process.127 States have therefore frustrated the
Commission’s endeavours to promote human rights in the continent. This is
aggravated by the Commission’s inability to take any draconian measures against
states that fail to comply with their reporting obligations. As a result impunity has
taken toll without any hope of immediate restraint.
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The Commission has also not been efficient in deliberating on state reports.
Given that it meets for only a limited period of time during which it is expected to
examine a number of reports, the Commission has not been able to discharge this role
expeditiously. It requires a quorum in order to take decisions at its sessions. If no
quorum exists-as was the case at the meeting in March 1991-then decisions must be
postponed until the following session six months later.128
(ii) Protection Flaws
The Commission’s protective mandate, otherwise known as the complaints procedure,
allows it to receive and consider complaints from both individuals and states parties to
the Charter. Under this procedure, the Commission is mandated to seek amicable
solutions, failing which it can make appropriate recommendations to the AHSG.129
However, like the reporting mechanism, this procedure is beset by a number of flaws,
prompting Posner to describe it as ‘so embryonic that we are basically looking at a
blank slate.’130 Several factors have contributed to this situation.
From the onset, the procedure is hamstrung by the time taken to process a
communication.131 Communications go through a lengthy, inefficient and bureaucratic
system of scrutiny. The Commissioners, who work on part-time basis, have limited
time to meritoriously examine within a reasonable time frame all the communications
presented before them. In the words of Nguema:
A complaint received by the secretariat cannot be considered by the Commission until its next
session which can be as much as six months away, at which point the Commission often
determines that crucial information is missing, postponing its full consideration until the
following session. In addition, the Commission must notify that complainant and offending
authority before it can determine whether or not the Commission has jurisdiction in the matter.
The formalities are prohibitively time consuming, especially in light of the fact that the
132
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The procedure is complicated further by the issue of admissibility.133 Whereas it is
desirable for a communication to comply with certain minimum requirements, it is
worth noting that the African system tends to apply double standards in the sense that
communications filed by individuals are subjected to a stricter eligibility test than
state communications.134 For example, individual communications must pass an
admissibility test which includes that their communications: are compatible with the
Charter of the Organization of African Unity or with the African Charter; are not
written in disparaging or insulting language directed against the State concerned and
its institutions or to the Organization of African Unity; are not based exclusively on
news disseminated through the mass media; are sent after exhausting local remedies,
if any, unless it is obvious that this procedure is unduly prolonged; are submitted
within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are exhausted or from the
date

the

Commission

is

seized

of

the

matter;

and

do not deal with cases which have been settled by these States involved in accordance
with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or the Charter of the
Organization of African Unity or the provisions of the African Charter.135
Some of these requirements are not easily tenable especially if the state
concerned wants to frustrate a complainant. In cases of gross violations of human
rights the criteria is even more demanding, making it almost prohibitive for victims to
opt for the procedure.136 These requirements are not imposed on states. It is therefore
more difficult for an individual, than a state, to get redress from the system.
The procedure is also affected by the infamous ‘confidentiality clause’ of the
Charter. All measures taken within the provisions of the Charter are to remain
confidential until such time as the AHSG shall otherwise decide.137 This provision of
the Charter could be abused time and again by states on the premise of the spirit of
‘comradeship’ that prohibits states from antagonizing each other. Making it a
prerogative of the states to decide the publication, or otherwise, of the findings and
measures taken by the Commission was one of the most flagrant miscalculation made
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by the drafters of the Charter. At the time of drafting the Charter, it was common
knowledge that the OAU members were not prepared to be challenged judicially
however grossly they violated human rights. Giving them the final word in the
regional process is by no means a motivation for impunity; after all, the Charter
allows them to be judges in their own cases.
The regime’s competence to grant effective remedies has similarly been on the
spotlight. The Commission has no jurisdiction to grant obvious remedies such as
monitory compensation. While the Commission can only make non-binding
recommendations to the AHSG, the entire process takes pretty long and at times is
overtaken by events. A good example is the Ken Saro-Wiwa case involving a
Nigerian human rights activist whose recommendation was issued after his execution
by the Sani Abacha regime.138 It is imperative for any sound judicial system, whether
domestic or international, to have adequate mechanisms to grant effective remedies to
aggrieved parties. The absence of remedial measures deprives the Commission of an
important tool necessary to achieve its purpose of protecting victims of human rights
violations in the continent. Consequently, this has compelled them to resort to their
respective domestic courts for redress, which courts fail them largely because of state
interference and lack of judicial independence.139
V CONCLUSION
The article has endeavoured to highlight the jurisdictional and procedural challenges
of interpreting and enforcing international human rights law in Africa under the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. While the present regime has come a
long way, tearing through a bulwark of political, socio-economic and cultural barriers,
there is room for improvement. Some of the challenges for instance political
insubordination and incoherence within the normative framework are ‘man-made’ and
can therefore be overcome through the changing of perception. Others such as
ideological differences are deeply entrenched in the socio-cultural fabric and may be
difficult to surmount, but surmountable all the same.
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The failures of the African Charter are not irreparable after all and something
can still be done to redeem it. While it was not possible to examine in detail all the
challenges it has encountered since inception in a paper of this length, the paper has
highlighted some of the hurdles that need to be addressed in order that the gains made
so far should not be lost. Like many other systems, the African regime is bound to
have its own shortcomings, which at this formative stage can be described as ‘mere
teething problems’ that will be overcome with the passage of time. The paper has
argued that the Charter could be reformed through the amendment of the provisions
and the rules of procedure, that are not in tandem with the norms and fundamental
principles of international human rights law.
To surmount some of these challenges, particularly those with a socio-cultural
bias, the regime should opt for sub-regional divisions that would concern themselves
with violations that are unique to such regions. This will popularise the Charter and
make it more acceptable throughout the continent. States should also be encouraged to
promote and popularise the regime in the domestic circles, although this has in the
past been a hard thing for them to do for reasons best known to them. Finally, states
parties to the Charter should encourage unbiased debate on the possible reforms to the
African Charter regime, at the domestic level. Whether or not the Charter will
withstand the test of time and survive the turbulent tide of political and socioeconomic changes sweeping across the globe will depend on the level of commitment
and political will of the states parties as well as their willingness to compromise on
socio-cultural and political preferences and inclinations.

